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authornic <ra@afu.re>2024-07-30 20:49:14 -0400
committernic <ra@afu.re>2024-07-30 20:49:14 -0400
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-## Ticker: NYSE:ABR
-### Arbor Realty Trust
-
-# Qualitative Analysis
-Two business segments: Structured Loan Origination and Investment Business
-Invest in the multifamily, single-family rental (“SFR”) and commercial real estate markets
-Also invest in real estate-related joint ventures and may directly acquire real property and invest in real estate-related notes and certain mortgage-related securities.
-Organized to qualify as a real estate investment trust (“REIT”)
-We provide a suite of comprehensive customized financing solutions to meet the various needs of borrowers. We target borrowers whose options may be limited by conventional bank financing.
-
-# timeframe
-default by max may 2025
-
-# 16 feb earnings
-Arbor CEO has just proclaimed that delinquencies are in the low single digits and the CLO data that Viceroy obtained from the trustee is wrong.
-
-This is a blatant lie, and easily verifyable
-
-# viceroy research
-PT = 0$
-Viceroy’s dive into Arbor’s CLOs suggest its entire loan book is distressed
-and underlying collateral is vastly overstated. These loans do not qualify for refinancing anywhere, and
-substantially all mature within the next 18 months. (written nov 16 2023)
-
-0% to 5% rates as derailed all ABR projects
-
-The current underlying DSCR of Arbor’s ~$7.6b CLOs is about 0.63x meaning their OI covers only 63% of their total debt service.
-There is no feasible rate cuts in the next 18 months that could salvage these projects.
-
-Arbor’s business model is to finance bridge loans for multifamily residential unit investments, typically through renovation periods. After renovation, Arbor can then refinance these bridge loans into agency loans.
-
-In order to access liquidity against these floating rate bridge loans, Arbor established Collateralized Loan
-Obligation facilities (CLOs)
-
-Billions of dollars of loans in CLOs were made to finfluencers and real estate “guru” syndicates who have
-zero real estate investment backgrounds. ex: Elisa Zhang
-
-Significant portion of the properties underlying the CLOs have atrocious reviews, including pictures, and
-have not been rehabilitated. Some properties have already been condemned and labelled as slums.
-
-Poor maintenance, poor security, vandalism, theft, and shootings are widely reported among properties.
-
-Lack of authentic good review
-
-Management appears to be raising rents of properties without any actual rehabilitation.
-
-The only feasible way that we believe Arbor can continue as a going concern is by refinancing bridging loans. Per
-above, we note that doing this is effectively just prolonging a catastrophe
-
-Arbor’s loan book substantially matures over the next 18 months. As shown in Section 6 below, new
-originations are fading quickly in high-rate environments that do not support most multifamily rehabilitation
-bridging projects
-
-NOI figures have not improved.
-
-The CLOs will inevitably breach covenants and become distressed
-
-Horrible management of propeties
-
-Severals lenders in Arbor’s CLOs (that arbor made loan's to) are in financial troubles